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Abstract—Automated human credibility screening
is an emerging research area that has potential for
high impact in fields as diverse as homeland
security and accounting fraud detection. Systems
that conduct interviews and make credibility
judgments can provide objectivity, improved
accuracy, and greater reliability to credibility
assessment practices, need to be built. This study
establishes a foundation for developing automated
systems for human credibility screening.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Systems that evaluate an individual’s truthfulness
are proliferating at a faster rate than ever before.
Two decades ago, the standard polygraph machine
was the only mainstream “lie detector” technology.
Today, lie detection systems range from handheld
devices that measure vocal features to systems that
involve inserting a person into a functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner to view activity in
the brain.
Research on deception detection has likewise
gained in popularity and favorability. Where
deception detection research was once the purview
only of cognitive psychology, we now see developed
streams of deception research from fields ranging
from communication, behavioral psychology, and
sociology, to neuroscience, computer science, and
information systems.
The drivers behind this growth are clearer now
than ever before. In a world where insiders leak
sensitive information, infidelity in relationships is on
the rise, business scandals destroy billions in wealth,
and terrorists plot to attack innocent people, systems
that can effectively judge an individual’s veracity can

provide value to perhaps every major aspect of our
lives.
However, there are several challenges to currently
used human screening techniques and technologies.
The most common interviewing protocols do not
enjoy scientific consensus. Additionally, technologies
often require a high skill level to operate, techniques
involve lengthy time requirements, and sensors can
be invasive. These and similar limitations serve as
barriers to more widespread application of deception
detection in practice. Unfortunately, many lie
detection systems ignore both established research
and theoretical and protocol limitations in favor of
expedience. This paper reviews literature related to
automated deception detection with the goal of
addressing the research question: How should key
deception detection theories and protocols inform the
investigation and development of automated human
screening systems1?
The purpose of this study is to review and
synthesize extant theory, protocols, and technologies
that can be leveraged to advance automated human
screening systems. We begin by reviewing the value
of technology in human veracity screening, followed
by a review of the principal theories and protocols in
deception detection research. We describe the
strengths and weaknesses of each in an automated
screening system context. Lastly, we review
technologies that have been or could be leveraged by
automated human screening systems.

1
For the context of this paper, we define human
screening system as a unique combination of
technology, actors, environment, and processes used
to judge an individual’s veracity.

A. Technology in Deception Detection
Technology has been used in credibility
assessment since at least 1895, when Cesare
Lombroso, an Italian criminologist, used a medical
device for measuring blood pressure changes during
police interrogations [1]. In the 1920s and 30s, John
Larson and Leonarde Keeler developed the nowwidely-known polygraph machine which measures
blood pressure, respiration, and skin conductance (a
measure of arousal) [2].
Recently, additional technologies for human
screening have been investigated including noncontact technologies for measuring heart rate and
blood pressure [3], and automated vocalic [4-6],
linguistic [7-9], oculometric [10-12], thermal [13,
14], and kinesic [15, 16] data capture and analysis
technologies.
Technology can clearly improve deception
detection accuracy. Unaided human deception
detection accuracy rate hovers near chance levels
[17]. However, when veracity decision makers are
aided by an effective screening system, accuracy
improves. There are many ways deception detection
systems can improve credibility assessment accuracy.
Table 1 suggests several ways in which systems can
improve accuracy.
TABLE 1. HOW SYSTEMS IMPROVE DECEPTION
DETECTION ACCURACY

1

2
3
4

5
6

Tactic for Improving Veracity
Judgments
Detecting and measuring deception
cues that humans are unable to
perceive
Processing many cues simultaneously
Conducting complex analyses
Increasing test control (e.g., using
more exact timing, minimizing
examiner bias)
Persuading examiners to better use
presented relevant information
Detecting countermeasures

Sample
References
[4, 10, 18]

[19]
[10, 19-21]
[12, 22]

[23]
[24-26]

In addition, there are other unexplored ways that
technology may assist in human screening. Some of
these include 1) having a virtual agent manipulate
examinees in a manner that will produce stronger
deception cues, 2) having a system process the most
non-problematic people in a rapid screening
environment automatically, freeing up time for
screeners to focus on the more questionable subjects,
3) Providing examiners with insight on which topics
need deeper probing, and 4) Capturing baseline data
for use in future screenings.

II. DECEPTION DETECTION THEORIES
APPLICABLE TO AUTOMATED SCREENING
The ability to identify deception is based on the
premise that the nonverbal and verbal behaviors
exhibited by truth tellers and deceivers differ. Many
of these “cues to deception” can be categorized as
linguistic [27, 28], vocalic [29], kinesic [30], and
oculometric [31, 32] features.
Due the prevalence of deception in
communication, people tend to use heuristics in an
attempt to identify when deception is occurring;
however, these heuristics are often inaccurate [32].
Furthermore,
because
of
these
heuristics,
communicators attempt to conceal the behaviors that
they perceive convey deception [32]. Research has
also suggested that humans have limited cognitive
capacity, suggesting that a human can only process a
limited number of tasks simultaneously. When
committing deception, a person may be fabricating a
story while attempting to stay relaxed, making eye
contact with the receiver, and conveying confidence.
Our belief is that a person may be able to control
some cues, and may even be highly adept at
controlling those cues, however, every person has a
limit to the number of cues that they can control
simultaneously. Based on prior work [3, 27] we
estimate that monitoring a set of 15 or more cues
exceeds the threshold of cognitive ability that would
be necessary to monitor and control those cues.
Several theories inform automated credibility
screening, including Four-Factor Theory (FFT),
Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT), and Orienting
Response (OR) theory.
Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal [33]
developed Four-Factor Theory (FFT) as an extension
of the leakage hypothesis presented by Ekman and
Friesen [34]. FFT more closely investigates the
internal factors that can influence outward displays of
deception, including: arousal, negative affect,
cognitive processing, and attempted control. As
deceivers attempt to control these factors, changes in
behavior are likely exhibited. Cues of deception
associated with these internal factors can be
manifested as behaviors that are stiff, rigid, awkward,
inexpressive, and lacking in spontaneity [33].
Arousal can be detected in lessened movement in the
extremities [29, 30]. Negative affect can be measured
by negative emotion word use [28], cognitive
processing can be measured by preposition use [28],
and attempted control can be measured by pupil
dilation or voice pitch [32]. All of these cues can be
measured using automated sensors.

Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) [35]
further subdivides Ekman’s deception cues into
strategic and nonstrategic behaviors. Strategic cues
are planned behaviors that occur because the deceiver
wishes to appear truthful. An example of strategic
cues would be the messages that the deceiver intends
to send. Attributes of the message such as length and
word choice may be used to identify deception, even
though these messages are crafted consciously by the
deceiver in an attempt to appear truthful.
Nonstrategic cues, on the other hand, are
unintentional behaviors occurring as a byproduct of
deception. Many of the cues used in automated
deception detection fall into the category of
nonstrategic cues. Pupil dilation, changes in the
voice, and postural shifts are all nonstrategic
indicators of deception.
A large part of automated deception detection is
based upon behavioral research on the orienting
response [36, 37]. The orienting response is an
autonomic reaction to a personally relevant stimulus
[37]. This response is highly relevant with eye
movement [38]. When there is a visual stimulus, the
eyes naturally and almost instantly move to the
stimulus without any cognitive effort. Using this
theory allows an automated screener to present visual
stimuli that are more salient for the target individual,
resulting in measurable changes in gaze behavior that
can be used to identify recognition.
Another area of investigation in deception
detection research is a mechanism we term defensive
responding. While the OR is thought to be a reaction
to any novel or personally significant stimulus,
defensive responding only occurs when that stimuli is
perceived to be aversive.
III.

DECEPTION DETECTION PROTOCOLS FOR
AUTOMATED SCREENING

The most common formalized methods for
detecting deception include the Control Question
Technique (CQT) [39], the Behavioral Analysis
Interview (BAI) [40], and the Concealed Information
Test (CIT) [41, 42]. Automated screening can mimic
these interviewing protocols in full, or it can develop
alternative protocols that may better serve an
automated screening context.
There is a benefit to mimicking existing protocols
or portions of these protocols that have theoretical
and empirical support. However, there are limitations
to existing interview protocols. The CQT, while it is
the most widely used, requires hours to complete.
The BAI can also require an hour or more.
Furthermore, both techniques require a high level of
interviewing skill in terms of manipulating the beliefs

of the examinee and following up on contextually
significant details in responses [43]. These skills are
difficult to effectively mimic. Thus, in deception
detection contexts, where time and cost are key
factors, alternative interviewing protocols are likely
more effective.
The CIT was developed as an alternative
approach to conducting criminal interviews [25]. The
premise of the CIT is that it tests a person’s
recognition of stimuli that only an individual
associated with a given crime or incident would be
aware of. The scientific underpinnings of the CIT are
grounded in the orienting response [44], which
results in physiological responses to recognized
stimuli that will be larger than physiological
responses to unrecognized stimuli. Individuals with
no knowledge of a given incident are expected to
respond to all stimuli randomly.
Furthermore, the CIT is a promising protocol for
rapid or secondary screening. It requires virtually no
skill on the part of the interviewer, enjoys wide
scientific consensus on validity, and has a simple
format that can be more easily automated. Though it
is the least commonly used technique in practice,
some researchers believe the CIT can and should be
employed more widely [45].
IV. NON-INVASIVE TECHNOLOGIES FOR
AUTOMATED DECEPTION DETECTION
Important to automated screening research is the
identification and development of noninvasive means
to detect deception. Below we discuss the different
technologies used for gathering information about
deception without the need for invasive sensors such
as those used in the polygraph. These technologies
include automated vocalic, kinesic, oculometric,
thermal, and linguistic data capture and analysis.
A. Vocalics
The voice is a rich source of information. Some
of the vocal cues important to the automated
detection of deception are voice quality, pitch, and
response latency. These three measures are reliable
indicators of either the stress or cognitive load
associated with deception. The voice has been
studied extensively as it relates to the communication
and understanding of emotion [46, 47].
Voice quality can be defined as the harmonics-tonoise ratio present in a given vocal recording [48].
Deception research investigating variances in voice
quality associated with truth and deception suggest
that liars tend to speak with a lower harmonic-tonoise ratio than those telling the truth [3]. This

variance can be attributed to increased cognitive
effort and the influence of stress and emotion [49].
The pitch of the voice, or the fundamental
frequency at which someone is speaking, is
controlled by contractions of the larynx in the throat.
It is closely related to tension, and thus increases in
stress or nervousness increase the pitch of the
speaker’s voice [31]. Attributes of a person’s pitch
that can be used in understanding emotion include the
average pitch during an utterance, as well as the
variability in pitch over the length of the utterance
[46].
Typically measured in milliseconds, response
latency is the length of time between when a question
is asked and when the person begins to respond.
Response latency is an important indicator of
cognitive load [50]. Increased cognitive load is one of
the theoretical bases for the detection of deception
[51-53]; we use cognitive load indicated by increased
response latency as a cue of deception.
B. Kinesics and Proxemics
The kinesic and proxemic indicators of deception
are many and varied. A meta-analysis found some
support for using lip presses, chin raises, fidgeting,
illustrators, facial pleasantness, and overall tension
ratings for differentiating truth from deception [31].
However, the effectiveness of these cues appear to be
moderated by motivation level [31], and is likely
moderated by culture, context, question type,
personality, and situational factors. For instance,
different cultures have different tendencies in
displaying facial pleasantness, and chin raises during
a response may have different meanings depending
on the nature of the question asked.
Thus, when systems incorporate kinesic cues to
deception, it is critical that the system include a
protocol designed to control for or at least minimize
the effects of moderating factors.
A more immediate challenge for incorporating
kinesics into automated screening systems is the
automation itself. In traditional research into nonverbal behavior, human judges review video
recordings of individuals and manually notate each
movement. To automate this approach, some
researchers have developed methods of capturing
body and facial movement by using computer vision
techniques to track the location of points on the body
over time. Abstract variables derived from this
approach have proven somewhat effective in
discriminating high from low veracity; however, a
mapping of these automatically generated cues to
specific motions and gestures is still needed.

An alternative but similar approach focused on
the lack of movement, or rigidity [16]. Rigidity is a
common correlate of deception, and some evidence
suggests it may be difficult to control [52].
Individuals under conditions of low veracity exhibit
less overall movement, and the movement that does
occur appears forced (i.e., movements are shorter in
duration and have greater velocity) [52, 54, 55].
Using computer vision techniques, Twyman
measured overall movement during a CIT, where no
communicative movement is present. An overall
decrease in movement during target items was found
among deceptive individuals [12].
C. Oculometrics
The eyes offer a rich set of cues for deception.
Pupil dilation, blinking patterns, and eye movement
can each be influenced by behavioral and
physiological correlates of deception.
Pupil dilation has been shown to be associated
with deception in many different contexts [56-58].
The dilation of the pupil varies not only with changes
in light, but also with cognitive processing [59],
memory load [60], orienting reflexes [56-58], and
attention and effort [61].
Eye movement is likewise influenced by
cognitive and affective factors. A number of studies
have investigated the use of eye gaze fixation points
to identify familiarity with faces. Ellis and colleagues
[62] and Althoff and Cohen [63] both explored the
interpretation of eye gaze fixation patterns on internal
and external facial features to identify familiarity.
The results of these studies were orthogonal. Stacey
and colleagues [64] leveraged a similar approach to
identifying familiarity, but were similarly unable to
discriminate between familiar and unfamiliar face
processing.
Additional work has been done to tie eye
movement patterns to deception and concealed
knowledge. The protocols employed in this initial
work have included a memory effects testing protocol
[65], the CQT [11], the CIT [12, 66, 67], and novel
methods for detecting hidden knowledge [68].
D. Linguistics
There has been much interest in employing
automated linguistic analysis to deception detection.
A meta-analysis of linguistic cues revealed that
response detail, plausibility, logical structure,
discrepancies,
involvement,
immediacy,
and
repetitions, as well as spontaneous corrections,
admissions of lack of memory, and related external
associations may be useful indicators of deception
[31]. Some of these cues are still questionable (a
result of non-homogeneity in surveyed studies), and

additional cues may be significant, but only during
certain contexts and under particular circumstances.

and respiration rate are gathered through the
measurement of vibrations on the surface of the skin.

In automated screening, the current state of
technology is such that not all promising linguistic
cues can be automatically extracted. For instance, an
understanding of contextual meaning and situational
norms is required to determine the plausibility of a
response. While natural language processing
techniques are making strides in understanding
semantics, there is still much work to be done before
systems will be able to make such a judgment such as
plausibility with an acceptable level of reliability.

Derrick et al. [71] investigated the use of the LDV
in uncovering deception and found an accuracy rate
of 64%, indicating that it is not suitable to be used
alone. However, in combination with the other
sensors and cues discussed above, the LDV may be
able to provide a valuable piece of information in
discovering deception. Furthermore, the addition of
cardio-respiratory measures could provide further
insight into the mental and emotional state of
interviewees.

Some research on automated linguistic analysis
for deception detection has found support for many
of the linguistic features identified in DePaulo [31],
while other research has found additional or in some
cases conflicting results. For linguistic analysis, it
may be important to consider whether the response is
verbal or written, the context of the questioning, and
the type of questions asked. It seems likely that
culture and personality factors also play an important
role. For this reason, results obtained from linguistic
analysis should be considered in light of these
factors.

Current LDV technology, however, is not ready
for a fully automated environment. A few key issues
identified in [71] are as follows: (1) An operator is
required to initially aim the laser at the interviewee,
(2) A clear line of sight to the neck is required,
meaning that some articles of clothing may impede
the ability to use this sensor, and (3) only the pulse
rate can be reported in real-time, while blood
pressure and respiration are recorded only after postprocessing. When these issues can be addressed, it
may be advisable to reconsider the LDV for inclusion
in an automated screening environment.

There are also technology limitations to
employing automated linguistic analysis to deception
detection. In a screening scenario, words are usually
spoken rather than written. Most, if not all, current
automated
transcription
technologies
require
calibration to an individual’s voice before an
acceptable level of automated transcription accuracy
can be obtained. Such calibration may be a
reasonable addition to extended screening, but the
additional time requirement would likely preclude
application to rapid screening applications. An
exception might be if individuals are expected to be
screened often by the same system, such as when
entering a secure facility regularly for work. In such
cases, an initial voice calibration process would be
the only requirement for capturing usable data for
linguistic analysis.

Other covert measures of respiration have also
been investigated for their effectiveness in detecting
deception [72]. The in-seat and backrest respiration
sensors used in this experiment were able to measure
respiratory rates much more subtly than the
pneumographs used in polygraph interviews, while
achieving similar levels of accuracy. These sensors,
though, are limited in that they require the
interviewee to be seated. However, if the context of
the automated screening allows for sitting
participants, such a device would be useful in
obtaining respiration information unobtrusively.

E. Cardiorespiratory measures
Pulse rate, blood pressure, and respiration rate are
all physiological cues that have been shown to have a
reliable association with deception [69, 70]. These
vary with deception because of the increased stress
and cognitive load associated with the process of
deceiving and monitoring the interaction. A Laser
Doppler Vibrometer (LDV) is a device that directs a
medically safe laser on the neck of a user and is
capable of reporting the pulse, blood pressure, and
respiration rate of an individual without the need to
attach a sensor to the body. Pulse, blood pressure,

F. Thermal measures
The use of thermal imaging to detect cues of
deception is a relatively novel area of investigation.
In this context, thermal imaging is widely used to
identify increases in regional facial blood flow in the
orbital areas surrounding the eyes [13, 14]. A number
of studies have also used thermal imaging to monitor
temperature changes in the forehead [73, 74]. One
proposed mechanism triggering these changes is the
fight or flight response [14]. As a part of this
response, blood is distributed across the body to
skeletal muscles [14]. Another proposed trigger is the
orienting response [37, 75].
Contributing to the surge of interest in this area is
the potential to measure cues of deception
noninvasively. This is a critical differentiation from
the widely-used polygraph examination. A

noninvasive tool will allow thermal data to be
collected both overtly and covertly [76].
Furthermore, changes in blood distribution and
localized elevated temperature are controlled by the
sympathetic nervous system, thus, this autonomic
response is likely resistant to countermeasures [77].
Research evaluating the accuracy rate of thermalbased deception detection is promising. Pavlidis [13]
and colleagues conducted a mock-crime experiment
during which subjects assaulted and stole money
from a dummy. Using thermal imaging data to
discriminate between guilty and innocent subjects
yielded a classification accuracy rate of 83%. A
different study tested both startle and mock-crime
experiments and reported a classification accuracy
rate of 87.2% [78]. Finally, Zhu and colleagues [74]
examined the accuracy rate of thermal imaging by
monitoring the corrugator muscle in the forehead,
and reported a classification accuracy rate of 76.3%.
Despite the promising findings in each of these
studies, others argue that thermal imaging is not
feasible for rapid screening.
Vrij [79] points out a number of obstacles. First,
the assumption is made that all deceivers will
demonstrate stress cues, which may be prevalent but
not ubiquitous. Second, there is a limited corpus of
research investigating the types of interviewing
techniques that would prove useful for rapid
screening. Third, accuracy rates close to 90% in the
lab are promising, but a 10% inaccuracy rate would
result in an alarming number of false positives in a
field setting.
Despite these criticisms, future research is needed
to determine if using thermal imaging is a viable tool
to identify cues of deception and recognition,
especially when used in conjunction with other
sensors.
V.

INVASIVE MEASURES FOR DETECTING
DECEPTION

Although our emphasis has been on noninvasive
methods for detecting deception, advances in
cognitive neuroscience have led to investigations
using more invasive technologies such as fMRI and
electroencephalograms (EEGs) that measure brain
functioning during deceptive responding, states of
high stress or cognitive overload [e.g., 18, 80-83].
The fMRI measures brain activity from changes in
blood flow in regions of the brain. The EEG
measures electrical activity and event-related
potentials such as responses to “oddball” stimuli.
These technologies, which are cumbersome,
expensive, and time-consuming to implement, are not
feasible for rapid screening but can be used to cross-

validate other noninvasive approaches. For example,
they can demonstrate whether the “executive” region
of the brain in the prefrontal cortex becomes engaged
during a deceptive narrative or whether novel stimuli
presented during a CIT alter brain wave patterns, thus
providing insights into how the brain produces and
processes deception.
VI.

OUR APPROACH

To address the need for automated human
credibility screening without sacrificing scientific
rigor, we have begun a stream of research on
automated human screening using a kiosk-based
approach. We have generally relied on a design
science approach, which focuses on building and
evaluating new IT artifacts to extend knowledge [84].
The first phase of our approach was identifying
sensors that could collect cues of deception and
concealed knowledge in a rapid, non-invasive
screening context. A variety of experimental tasks
have been used to test and calibrate the sensors,
including: mock-crime experiments, simulated
screening experiments, and automated screening
interviews using embodied agents. More than 2000
subjects have participated in these studies.
A first-generation kiosk was created with the
intention to demonstrate a proof-of-concept. It served
as a framework for testing sensors and incorporating
the first attempt at using an embodied agent to
conduct automated interviews. Its dynamic design
allowed ease in adding, removing and calibrating
sensors.
A second iteration, termed the Automated Virtual
Agent for Truth Assessments in Real Time
(AVATAR) was designed to incorporate additional
sensors and other features relevant to deployment in
the field, including a biometric fingerprint scanner,
an RFID passport reader, and a magnetic strip reader
for processing fees [3]. To collect data to improve
future designs of the AVATAR, a field test at a U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) office in
Nogales, Arizona was conducted, and data from that
field test is currently being analyzed.
To facilitate iterative kiosk design, building, and
experimentation, we also developed an Automated
Screening Kiosk (ASK) that is modular and easily
changeable. The ASK has already been successfully
used in several experiments utilizing a CIT paradigm
[12].
VII. CURRENT CHALLENGES AND FUTURE
DIRECTIONS
Because this is a new area of research, there are
many challenges to be addressed. These challenges

range from experimental considerations to ensure
validity to policy considerations to ensure

compliance with law. A sampling of these challenges
is listed in Table 2.

TABLE 2. AUTOMATED CREDIBILITY SCREENING SYSTEM RESEARCH CHALLENGES

1

Challenge
Ensuring Realism in Experimental
Research

2

Integrating System and Human
Judgment

3

Minimizing or Controlling for
Environmental Factors

4

Minimizing or Controlling for
Cultural or Personality Factors

5

Detecting or Minimizing the
Effectiveness of Countermeasures

6

Increasing Accuracy of
Automated Transcription

7

Adjusting Models for Different
Base Rates

8

Designing Effective Protocols for
Field Experiments

9

Visualizing System Output for
Decision Support

10

Integrating so as to decrease,
rather than increase decision time

11

Adapting to account for
Psychological Deficiencies

12

Ensuring Proper Training for
Different Types of Users

13

Addressing Corporate and
Municipal Policy Concerns

Challenge Description
Since credibility cues are linked to cognitive and behavioral reactions to real-world theoretical
constructs, it is important to replicate those theoretical constructs realistically in the laboratory or
results will not generalize.
In many scenarios, a credibility system judgment will inform or otherwise be merged with a human
judgment. There is some evidence of potential for loss of effectiveness as a result. How can the
correct outcome be best assured in these situations?
While many credibility assessments usually occur in a closed room with few distractions, those that
occur as part of a job interview, forensic accounting interview, or rapid screening interview may
take place in a noisy environment that could affect sensors, responses, and interactions.
In few cases will a physiological or behavioral response be culture or personality agnostic. Further
research needs to discover how relevant cultural norms and personality traits affect cues to deception
in various contexts.
Countermeasures are methods examinees employ to try and trick a credibility assessment into
generating a truthful judgment. Countermeasures has long been an important area of research in
deception detection, but new methods and measures introduce additional complexities.
Linguistic measures of deception show great promise, but in many credibility assessment contexts
only verbal responses are recorded, or typed or written responses are not feasible. In such cases,
automated transcription will be necessary to take advantage of these linguistic cues. Automatic
transcription increases in difficulty when no training set is available or possible to obtain or when
background noise is present.
Most experimental research in deception detection uses a parametric design. However, real-world
applications may have much different positive rates, and models will need to be adjusted to account
for these differences.
A major challenge with field experiments is establishing ground truth. That is, it is difficult to
determine actual credibility a priori or ex post facto, so that system judgments can be compared to
known fact. Effective field experimental protocols will need to obtain ground truth or be able to
effectively estimate it.
Automated Credibility Screening Systems have the potential to produce a large amount of input for
decision makers. How to best present this information to decision makers and managers is an open
question for future research.
A key goal of most automated credibility systems is to reduce manual labor. Especially in rapid
screening contexts, systems will need to be designed such that throughput will at least not decrease,
but potentially increase through fully automated processing of the least risky examinees.
How psychological deficiencies such as psychopathy may affect automated credibility assessment
systems is an open research question. Related research suggests that it is an important area to
address.
Some decision makers such as rapid screening officers will be interacting with these systems on a
regular basis, while others such as small business hiring committees will use them infrequently.
There is a risk of improper use or disuse among users of different personality types and dispositions.
How should training be adapted for each context?
Privacy is an important concern. The United States Supreme Court has forbidden the use of the
standard polygraph to screen applicants, except for government positions. What will be the
challenges to public acceptance of this new technology, and how can these challenges be addressed
while ensuring privacy and security of personal data?

While the challenges are complex and diverse,
they can be used to help guide future research. First,
the accuracy rates of technologies used to identify
cues of deception and concealed knowledge must be
tested, and ultimately improved, by conducting
laboratory experiments promoting realism and
generalizability. This will require additional research
testing the sensors discussed in this paper, as well as
identifying new sensors that are feasible and relevant
for rapid, noninvasive credibility assessments.
Second, the realism and dynamism of embodied
agents used to conduct the automated interviews must

be improved. As embodied agents become more
effective, they can be used more efficiently to elicit
information, foster trust and credibility, and
ultimately, improve the accuracy of the system as a
whole. Third, prior research suggests that users of
decision support systems often disregard the
recommendations provided to them. Thus, additional
research is needed to investigate the way in which
such systems could foster credibility with end users,
and ultimately, provide value to the organization.
Fourth, transitioning such a system from
development to use in the field will require additional

considerations regarding information privacy,
securing data compiled by sensors, and overcoming
obstacles imposed by government and municipal
policies that may hinder implementation.
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